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Abstract 
 
The euro area has been experiencing a prolonged period of weak economic activity and very low inflation. 
This paper reviews models of business cycle stabilization with an eye to formulating lessons for policy in 
the euro area. According to standard models, after a large recessionary shock accommodative monetary 
and fiscal policy together may be necessary to stabilize economic activity and inflation. The paper 
describes practical ways for the euro area to be able to implement an effective monetary-fiscal policy mix. 
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“(…) [T]he Fed, especially with short-term interest rates close to zero, couldn’t do it alone. The 
economy needed help from Congress (…).”     Bernanke, 2015, p. 504 
“(…) [T]he central bank in [the United States and Japan] could act and has acted as a backstop for 
government funding. This is an important reason why markets spared their fiscal authorities the loss 
of confidence that constrained many euro area governments’ market access.”   Draghi, 2014 
Executive Summary 
The euro area has been going through a prolonged period of weak economic activity and very low 
inflation. Motivated by this experience, this paper reviews models of business cycle stabilization with 
an eye to formulating lessons for policy in the euro area. One takeaway from the literature is that 
monetary policy alone may fail to stabilize economic activity and inflation satisfactorily. Following a 
large adverse shock, the lower bound on nominal interest rates can constrain conventional 
monetary policy for a significant length of time. Unconventional monetary policy, while helpful, may 
turn out to be indecisive, especially if long-term interest rates are low to begin with and financial 
markets are undisrupted. Another takeaway is that at a time when the central bank’s policy rates are 
at or close to their lower bound, one can expect accommodative fiscal policy to have sizable effects. 
Achieving and maintaining an accommodative fiscal policy stance has proved difficult in the euro 
area. A key problem is that debt issued by the fiscal authorities in the euro area is subject to the risk 
of default or restructuring. As the recent experience shows, in this setting fiscal accommodation can 
indeed give rise to expectations of default or restructuring that counteract or reverse any initial 
stimulative effects. To make matters worse, the expectations of default or restructuring can be self-
fulfilling. Although the Outright Monetary Transactions program launched by the European Central 
Bank in 2012 has eliminated or at least reduced the possibility of self-fulfilling creditor runs on a 
euro area member state, the program per se falls short of creating the conditions necessary for an 
accommodative fiscal policy stance to be achieved. 
This paper attempts to define the conditions necessary for the euro area to have an effective 
stabilization policy. We organize the discussion around an example of a specific – by no means the 
only possible – institutional setup with two key elements. The first element would be the 
introduction of a non-defaultable Eurobond issued by a “euro area fund,” similar to the European 
Stability Mechanism. By “non-defaultable” we mean that the fund and the ECB would ensure that 
maturing Eurobonds, issued as part of a concerted policy intervention, would be convertible into 
currency at par, analogously to maturing reserve deposits at the ECB. The fund would stand ready to 
purchase national public debt of each member state so long as the member state’s fiscal policy 
satisfied ex-ante set criteria. The fund, subject to democratic control, would be given a strictly 
limited ability to tax uniformly across the member states (e.g., a small VAT surcharge) and could be 
endowed with seigniorage revenues from the Eurosystem. The fiscal criteria would be formulated so 
as to make fiscal accommodation possible after a severe recessionary shock, while being consistent 
with fiscal discipline for each country. 
The second element would be the ability for euro area member states to be able to restructure 
national public debt as a last resort in an orderly way, without prejudice to full participation in the 
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European Union or the euro, with the fund being treated equally with private creditors, in case a 
member state failed to meet the fiscal criteria and was unable or unwilling to borrow exclusively 
from private creditors. The fund would stand ready to resume lending after national public debt had 
been restructured, as soon as the member state satisfied the fiscal criteria again. 
The fund would also be able to backstop, when necessary, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the 
proposed European deposit insurance scheme. With a euro-area-level backstop in place, the Single 
Resolution Mechanism could wind down, in an orderly fashion, banks that might become insolvent 
because of restructuring of national public debt, while the common deposit insurance scheme would 
act to prevent bank runs in all member states of the euro. 
One could argue that, since a euro area institution able to issue non-defaultable debt already exists, 
the ECB, the simplest solution would be for that institution to act as the fund described here. Indeed, 
a policy mix consisting of the ECB keeping its interest rates low and expanding the monetary base in 
order to purchase national public debt – as implemented in the Public Sector Purchase Program – 
together with fiscal accommodation by the member states would have had sizable effects on the 
economy and remains a sensible short-term option. In the paper we explain why the institutional 
structure including the fund, outlined here, appears preferable in the medium and long run. 
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1   Introduction 
Standard macroeconomic models explain why fluctuations in aggregate economic activity can be 
excessive and suggest that appropriate stabilization policy can dampen the undesirable variability. 
The member states of the euro have been experiencing a prolonged period of weak economic 
activity and very low inflation. At the end of 2015, real per capita GDP of the euro area was 1.6 
percent below its level eight years before, at the end of 2007, as a consequence of the Great 
Recession, the second recession of 2012-2013 and the subsequent slow recovery. The average 
annual rate of inflation for the euro area measured in terms of the Harmonized Index of Consumer 
Prices dropped to zero in 2015, having decreased in each year starting in 2012. The inflation rate 
quantified with the GDP deflator – a more direct indicator of home-grown price pressures than the 
HICP – remained between 0.7 percent and 1.3 percent in every year from 2009 to 2015. Since 2008 
the ECB has brought its policy interest rates essentially to zero and has engaged in multiple kinds of 
unconventional monetary policy. Meanwhile, while national fiscal policies were accommodative in 
the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, they became non-accommodative soon 
thereafter, even in the member states with relatively strong fiscal fundamentals. The primary budget 
balance for the euro area as a whole improved in each year between 2009 and 2015, from -3.5 
percent of GDP in 2009 to 0.3 percent of GDP in 2015, including in 2012 and 2013, two years in 
which euro area output contracted.1 The current recovery appears tepid. If a sizable negative shock 
were to occur again in the near future, there would be few reasons for optimism about the euro 
area’s resilience to it. 
Below we review standard business cycle models commonly used in academia and in policy 
institutions. The key lesson is that accommodative monetary and fiscal policy together – not only 
accommodative monetary policy – may be necessary for macroeconomic stabilization in the wake 
of a large adverse disturbance such as the global financial crisis of 2008. We describe practical ways 
for the euro area to be able to pursue an effective stabilization policy. 
2   Monetary policy alone may fail to stabilize economic activity and 
inflation 
Standard models and the recent experience of a number of advanced economies suggest that 
monetary policy alone may fail to stabilize economic activity and inflation satisfactorily due to the 
lower bound on nominal interest rates. 
To see the role of the lower bound in macroeconomic stabilization, it is helpful to distinguish 
between small or moderate business cycle shocks and less frequent, large adverse disturbances. 
Models and the historical record between the mid-1980s and the Great Recession suggest that 
conventional monetary policy can smooth out the effects of typical business cycle shocks. In the 
face of small or moderate disturbances to the demand side of the economy, the central bank can 
stabilize economic activity and inflation by setting its policy rates such that the implied real interest 
1 The source of the data on GDP per capita and inflation is AMECO, the annual macroeconomic database of the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. The source of the data on the 
primary budget balance is the ECB. 
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rate mimics the “natural” real rate of interest, i.e., the real rate at which no inflationary or 
deflationary pressures materialize. For instance, counteracting a deflationary fall in demand requires 
a reduction in the policy rates sufficient to make the real rate match the new, lower natural rate. A 
decrease in the real rate stimulates economic activity thereby alleviating deflationary pressures. In 
addition, fiscal “automatic stabilizers” such as unemployment benefits can help dampen undesirable 
business cycle fluctuations and reduce their social costs. Of course, complexities that policymakers 
face in practice make it impossible to achieve the desirable level of macroeconomic stabilization at 
each point in time. That being said, conventional interest rate policy, supported by fiscal automatic 
stabilizers, appears capable of producing more or less satisfactory business cycle outcomes in 
“normal times,” that is, after small or moderate disturbances.2 
By contrast, the recent experience has demonstrated that following a large adverse shock the 
lower bound on nominal interest rates can constrain conventional monetary policy for a 
significant length of time. Consider a private sector deleveraging disturbance of the kind that many 
observers believe caused the Great Recession. As households and firms attempt to save more, the 
natural real rate falls into negative territory. The real rate can then remain stuck above the natural 
rate because the central bank cannot cut the policy rates below their lower bound, which is 
approximately zero. The real rate can be too high and economic activity and inflation too low – 
possibly for a long time – relative to what would be desirable.3 
A further challenge for policymakers is that when the policy rates are constrained by the lower 
bound, the economy can follow many trajectories and the central bank may fail to influence which 
path the economy assumes. Monetary policy may even be unable to ensure that fluctuations in the 
inflation rate concentrate around the central bank’s inflation objective. Long spells at the lower 
bound with inflation varying around a level below the central bank’s objective become possible.4 
To circumvent the lower bound constraint, central banks have engaged in two kinds of 
unconventional monetary policy: the communication about future policy rates known as “forward 
guidance” and a variety of balance-sheet policies. Macroeconomic models and the historical record 
suggest that unconventional monetary policy can help stabilize the economy but they also caution 
that, in some circumstances, forward guidance and balance-sheet policies may prove indecisive. 
Models imply that forward guidance should involve the central bank telling the public that the policy 
rates will remain low even after the economy has recovered. To the extent that forward guidance is 
successful, long-term real interest rates decline stimulating economic activity and counteracting 
deflationary pressures.5 While forward guidance can help improve macroeconomic outcomes, its 
effects are bound to be limited if long-term interest rates are low to begin with. Furthermore, 
2 The simple, standard model of conventional monetary policy can be found in, e.g., Woodford (2003) and Galí 
(2015). Quantitative versions of the standard model have been shown to fit macroeconomic data (see, e.g., 
Christiano et al., 2005, and Smets and Wouters, 2007). The model has been extended in a number of 
directions, for instance, to incorporate frictions in the labor market (e.g., by Christiano et al., 2015) and in the 
financial sector (starting with Bernanke et al., 1999). 
3 The classic model of interest rate stabilization policy in the presence of the lower bound is in Eggertsson and 
Woodford (2003). Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) and Agarwal and Kimball (2015) write about the possibility 
of eliminating the lower bound constraint. 
4 Formally, economic activity and inflation can be indeterminate. See Benhabib et al. (2001), Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe (2013), Mertens and Ravn (2014), and Aruoba et al. (2015). 
5 The classic treatment of forward guidance is in Eggertsson and Woodford (2003). See also Krugman (1998). 
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private agents may fail to respond to forward guidance if they have little history of central bank 
communication about future policy rates to rely on and have been accustomed to the policy rates 
reacting swiftly to signs of economic recovery and rising inflation in the past. 
Balance-sheet policies can have sizable effects on asset prices, economic activity, and inflation at 
times when financial markets are disrupted. Instances are the balance-sheet policies implemented 
during or in the immediate aftermath of the recent financial crisis in order to repair or substitute for 
malfunctioning markets such as the market for mortgage-backed securities and the interbank money 
market. When limits to arbitrage are pervasive (for example, when many investors face tightening 
borrowing constraints and consequently find themselves forced to dispose of assets), asset 
purchases by the central bank can have powerful stabilizing consequences. However, the favorable 
effects of balance sheet policies – in particular, of an expansion in the monetary base to finance 
purchases of government bonds by the central bank – are likely to become more limited as the 
functioning of financial market improves.6 Admittedly, some limits to arbitrage exist even in 
“normal times” and some investors value government bonds not only for their pecuniary returns. 
Consequently, purchases of government bonds by the central bank can produce some stimulus also 
when financial markets operate smoothly. Furthermore, such purchases can have beneficial 
consequences in conjunction with forward guidance, if long-term interest rates are not too low to 
begin with and if the private sector interprets the purchases as a signal of future accommodative 
interest rate policy. Finally, purchases of government bonds by the central bank may coordinate 
agents’ expectations on a desirable path for economic activity and inflation. All in all, though, 
unconventional monetary policy may prove insufficient to stabilize the economy satisfactorily. 
3   Monetary policy and fiscal policy together can stabilize economic 
activity and inflation 
Precisely at a time when the central bank’s policy rates are expected to stay at or close to the 
lower bound for an extended period of time, monetary and fiscal policy together can have a 
sizable impact on the economy. 
Macroeconomics has emphasized that fiscal policy is an effective stabilization tool in or near a 
liquidity trap. Following the literature, it is helpful to focus on two types of stylized fiscal 
interventions that, while being complementary, rely on distinct transmission mechanisms. The first 
intervention consists of a temporary increase in government spending, keeping constant the 
present value of primary budget surpluses.7 “Temporary,” in this context, means that the fiscal 
accommodation is to last approximately as long as the central bank’s policy rates remain at the 
lower bound. “Keeping constant the present value of primary surpluses” means that the fiscal 
accommodation is to be followed by an adjustment to taxes, transfers, or government spending such 
that overall the present value of primary surpluses is the same with the intervention as without it. 
6 See, for instance, Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), Cúrdia and Woodford (2011), Del Negro et al. (2011), 
Gertler and Karadi (2011), Chen et al. (2012), Gertler and Karadi (2013), and Engen et al. (2015). 
7 To clarify, we always mean “real government spending” and “real primary surplus”, adjusted for inflation. 
Moreover, we define each fiscal policy intervention relative to a baseline in the absence of an adverse 
disturbance that we assume has occurred. If the baseline involves a decrease in government spending, it 
suffices that government spending falls less than in the baseline. 
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An increase in government spending can be expected to stimulate demand and output at the current 
price level. Marginal costs rise as output increases. Higher marginal costs translate into higher 
contemporaneous prices and – in the presence of some degree of price stickiness – into higher 
expected inflation. With the policy rates at the lower bound, the rise in expected inflation reduces 
the real interest rate, which stimulates investment and consumption, setting in motion a beneficial 
feedback loop. By how much an increase in government spending drives up economic activity and 
inflation depends on a plethora of characteristics of the economy. However, under realistic 
conditions the multiplier effect of government spending on output at the lower bound can be 
sizable. For the multiplier to be sizable it is essential that monetary policy accommodate the fiscal 
stimulus, by keeping the policy rates unchanged at the lower bound sufficiently long. Only if the 
policy rates fail to increase (or at most increase weakly) can the real interest rate fall creating the 
beneficial feedback loop.8 
The second intervention consists of measures amounting to a decrease in the present value of 
primary surpluses.9 To see how such measures can provide stimulus, suppose for the moment that 
public debt is non-defaultable. By “non-defaultable” we mean that public debt is denominated in a 
fiat currency and the fiscal and monetary authorities ensure that maturing government bonds are 
convertible into currency at par, analogously to maturing reserve deposits at the central bank.10 If 
public debt is non-defaultable and the fiscal authority lowers the present value of primary surpluses, 
the value of debt in real terms must fall correspondingly, implying that the price level will increase 
and – in the presence of some degree of price stickiness – output will expand in the short run.11 This 
can be a desirable outcome if economic activity is weak and inflation is too low to begin with. By way 
of example, consider an increase in transfers from the government to households lasting 
approximately as long as the policy rates remain at the lower bound. As the present value of 
transfers rises, households are wealthier at the current price level. Households raise their demand 
for goods, and output and marginal costs increase. Higher marginal costs translate into higher 
contemporaneous prices and higher expected inflation. With the policy rates at the lower bound, 
the rise in expected inflation reduces the real interest rate, which boosts investment while further 
stimulating consumption. The multiplier effect of a change in transfers on output at the lower 
bound can be sizable. As in the case of the first fiscal intervention, however, it is essential that 
monetary policy accommodate the fiscal stimulus, by keeping the policy rates at the lower bound 
(or at most raising them weakly).12 It is also worth emphasizing that the paths of economic activity 
8 For analysis of the macroeconomic effects of government spending see, e.g., Romer and Bernstein (2009), 
Christiano et al. (2011), Eggertsson (2011), Woodford (2011), Coenen at al. (2012), Werning (2012), Schmidt 
(2013), Nakata (2015), and Rendahl (2015). 
9 To reiterate, we define each fiscal policy intervention relative to a baseline in the absence of an adverse 
shock that we assume has occurred. If the baseline involves an increase in the primary surplus, it suffices that 
the primary surplus rises less than in the baseline. 
10 It is unnecessary for maturing government bonds to be convertible into currency at par in all states of the 
world. It suffices if maturing government bonds issued as part of a concerted policy intervention, e.g., when 
the economy finds itself in a liquidity trap, are convertible into currency at par. 
11 Any economic model with public debt includes a relationship stating that the value of public debt, in real 
terms, is equal to the present value of primary surpluses. For simplicity, we abstract here from the present 
value of seigniorage. 
12 While keeping the policy rates at the lower bound may require the monetary base to rise, it is unimportant 
how the central bank expands the monetary base (e.g., by purchasing government debt or by making loans to 
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and inflation are uniquely determined in an economy in which fiscal stimulus of either kind 
described here occurs when the economy finds itself in or near a liquidity trap. Accommodative 
fiscal policy adopted at an appropriate time can steer the economy onto a desirable path despite 
the lower bound. See Box A for an expanded discussion.13 
While it is instructive to think of the two fiscal interventions as distinct, it may be difficult to 
distinguish them in practice. For instance, if policymakers increase government spending (first 
intervention) without being explicit about subsequent budgetary adjustment, private agents are 
likely to attach some probability to the event that the present value of primary surpluses has 
declined (second intervention). 
In a monetary union, of course, economic activity may fluctuate excessively in individual member 
states even if the single monetary policy of the union succeeds in stabilizing union-wide economic 
activity and inflation. The possibility of asymmetric business cycles provides an additional reason, 
specific to the context of a monetary union, to use fiscal policy stabilization tools. The business 
cycle fluctuations in the euro area have in fact been asymmetric, in particular following the onset of 
the sovereign debt crisis in 2010, in that the macroeconomic outcomes have differed markedly 
across the member states.14 
It is also important to recognize the connection between fiscal policy and the effectiveness of 
central banks’ purchases of government bonds. Suppose that fiscal policy makes the primary 
surplus rise with the real value of government bonds including government bonds held by the central 
bank, at least eventually. Under this kind of fiscal policy, an expansion in the monetary base to 
finance purchases of government bonds by the central bank leaves unaffected private agents’ 
wealth (the sum of the monetary base and government bonds in the hands of the public) relative to 
the primary surpluses. By contrast, consider the case in which fiscal policy makes the primary surplus 
respond only to the real value of government bonds in the hands of the public. Then a permanent 
expansion in the monetary base to finance purchases of government bonds by the central bank 
increases private agents’ wealth relative to the primary surpluses (because the primary surpluses 
decline as the quantity of government bonds in the hands of private agents falls). This wealth effect 
can be expected to boost economic activity. One can anticipate identical, sizable effects on 
economic activity if the central bank prints currency and transfers it to households (“a helicopter 
drop”), provided that fiscal policy does not raise the primary surpluses by the amount of the 
helicopter drop.15 
banks). For analysis of the effects of a decrease in the present value of primary surpluses at the lower bound 
see, e.g., Bianchi and Melosi (2015) and Leeper at al. (2015). 
13 In standard models of monetary policy there is, in addition, a different kind of indeterminacy than the one 
we focus on: Monetary policy alone cannot rule out that private agents lose confidence in a fiat currency, 
which will lead to inflation. Tax revenues (i.e., fiscal policy) are necessary. Note that this indeterminacy arises 
under the assumption that fiscal policy does not undertake the accommodative interventions that we 
describe. See, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff (1983), Cochrane (2011), and Sims (2013). 
14 For example, at the end of 2015 real per capita GDP of Germany was 6 percent above its level from the end 
of 2007, whereas in the same period real per capita GDP decreased by 11 percent in Italy, 6 percent in Spain, 1 
percent in the Netherlands, and 8 percent in Finland. Concerning the importance of fiscal policy for business 
cycle stabilization in a monetary union see, e.g., Galí and Monacelli (2008) and Ferrero (2009). 
15 See Sims (1999), Benhabib et al. (2002), and Woodford (2003). 
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Box A:   How fiscal policy can guarantee that economic activity and 
inflation are uniquely determined 
This box explains how fiscal policy can eliminate the indeterminacy problem arising from the 
presence of the lower bound on nominal interest rates in the context of a standard monetary 
business cycle model with rational expectations. The discussion focuses on fiscal interventions that 
keep the present value of primary surpluses constant. For fiscal policies that avoid indeterminacy by 
means of lowering the present value of primary surpluses see Benhabib et al. (2002) and Woodford 
(2003). 
The behavior of inflation, interest rates, output and its components is represented by a forward-
looking Phillips curve, a consumption Euler equation, an aggregate resource constraint, and a 
conventional Taylor-type nominal interest rate rule that accounts for the lower bound. In the 
baseline setup the government keeps public spending constant. The presence of the lower bound 
implies that the model has two deterministic steady states. That is, abstracting from exogenous 
shocks and assuming that all variables remain constant over time, there exist, in general, two 
permissible outcomes for the inflation rate, real activity, and the short-term nominal interest rate. In 
the intended steady state, inflation is at the central bank’s target, the policy rate is strictly positive, 
and real GDP is at potential. In the lower bound steady state, inflation is below target, the policy rate 
is stuck at the lower bound, and real GDP is subdued. The rationale behind the existence of the 
lower bound equilibrium is as follows. If inflation expectations are sufficiently below target, the 
monetary policy rule triggers a reduction of the policy rate to the lower bound. At the lower bound, 
low expected inflation raises the real interest rate. In response to the higher real interest rate, 
households reduce consumption and increase labor supply. In order for the labor market to clear, 
real wages have to fall, thereby reducing firms’ real marginal costs. A decline in real marginal costs 
leads to a decline in prices, validating the low inflation expectations. 
Accommodative fiscal policy can rule out the lower bound steady state. At the heart of the remedy is 
the Phillips curve, which prescribes a relationship between inflation and average real marginal costs. 
In steady state this relationship takes the form 
𝜙𝜙
𝜃𝜃
(1− 𝛽𝛽)(𝜋𝜋 − 1)𝜋𝜋 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 1 
where π is the gross inflation rate, mc denotes average real marginal costs, and 𝜙𝜙,𝜃𝜃 > 0 and 𝛽𝛽 ∈ 
(0,1) are parameters.16 According to the Phillips curve, a below-target inflation rate (π<1) can be a 
steady-state outcome if and only if real marginal costs are subdued (mc<1).17 Marginal costs are, 
however, not independent of fiscal policy. An increase in public spending raises firms’ labor demand, 
which in turn puts upward pressure on wages and thereby on real marginal costs. A fiscal policy rule 
that stipulates a sufficiently aggressive increase in government spending if inflation and real activity 
were to be too low can therefore insulate the economy from the lower bound steady state. The 
16 In this example, price rigidities take the form of quadratic adjustment costs. Parameter 𝜙𝜙 reflects the size of 
the price adjustment costs, 𝜃𝜃 denotes the price elasticity of demand, and 𝛽𝛽 is the households’ subjective 
discount factor. 
17 In the intended steady state 𝜋𝜋 = 1 and 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 1.  
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intended steady state becomes the unique steady state. The response of economic activity and 
inflation to disturbances is uniquely determined. 
A formal treatment and several extensions are in Schmidt (2016).  
4   Why achieving an accommodative fiscal policy stance is difficult in 
the euro area 
Achieving and maintaining an accommodative fiscal policy stance has proved difficult in the euro 
area, in the current institutions setting. To see why, it is helpful to reconsider the two fiscal 
interventions from the previous section in the context of Europe’s monetary union. 
Suppose that a government increases spending and the budget deficit, aiming to keep constant 
the present value of the primary surpluses through future fiscal consolidation. In a country that 
issues its own fiat currency, the national fiscal and monetary authorities together can ensure that 
public debt is non-defaultable and the interest rates on public debt stay low as the fiscal 
accommodation unfolds. In the euro area, especially during the sovereign debt crisis, national public 
debt of several member states has been perceived to be subject to the risk of default or 
restructuring, to various degrees (and one member state, Greece, has restructured its euro-
denominated public debt).18 In this setting, if a member state increases government spending and 
the budget deficit, it is possible that government bond yields remain low and the economic 
outcomes improve, in line with the discussion in the previous section. However, a key lesson from 
models of public debt with default risk is that government bond yields can be driven by purely self-
fulfilling beliefs. Thus, given the same fiscal fundamentals, it is also possible that bond holders 
coordinate on an adverse scenario in which yields rise. In this case, reminiscent of the recent 
experience of several euro area member states, expectations of default or debt restructuring risk 
becoming self-fulfilling: a government that would have been solvent if the yields had stayed low 
can end up being insolvent, because it finds itself unable or unwilling to stabilize debt by increasing 
primary surpluses sufficiently after the yields have risen.19 
The mere perception by bond holders that government default or debt restructuring is possible 
has immediate adverse effects on the economy, even if primary surpluses ultimately increase to 
ensure solvency. First, when government bond yields rise reflecting the probability of default or debt 
restructuring, the fiscal authority typically cuts spending and raises taxes. Either action depresses 
economic activity, reducing or reversing any desirable effects of the original stimulus. Second, as the 
perceived probability of government default increases, firms and households often also face rising 
18 Sims (2012) emphasizes the distinction between sovereign debt denominated in a fiat currency that the 
sovereign can control and euro-denominated sovereign debt of euro area member states. 
19 For recent models of public debt with default risk see Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), Nicolini et al. (2015), 
Corsetti and Dedola (2016), and Jarociński and Maćkowiak (2016). Bond yields are typically indeterminate in 
these models unless public debt is low (or very high). Therefore, one could argue that to avoid the 
indeterminacy a euro area member state should reduce its public debt. The problem is that decreasing 
government debt is costly for economic activity and social welfare. Accordingly, models of optimal fiscal policy 
suggest that it is preferable to reduce public debt slowly, if at all. See Barro (1979), Sims (2001), Schmitt-Grohé 
and Uribe (2004), and Adam (2011). Furthermore, in the wake of an adverse shock it is generally optimal to 
increase public debt, which can reintroduce the possibility of indeterminacy. 
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borrowing costs, and they respond by lowering investment and consumption.20 Third, an expectation 
can arise that a default by a member state may lead to the member state’s exit from the euro area. 
The specter of exit from the euro can be very detrimental to economic activity, in particular because 
creditors may withdraw funds even from perfectly solvent banks if worries arise that deposits and 
other private debt contracts may be redenominated. Finally, the costs stemming from the possibility 
of government default in one member state of a monetary union are likely to be transmitted to 
some degree, via economic spillovers and market contagion, to other member states. 
The Outright Monetary Transactions program launched by the ECB in 2012 has eliminated or at 
least reduced the possibility of self-fulfilling creditor runs on a euro area member state, but the 
program per se falls short of creating the conditions necessary for an accommodative fiscal policy 
stance to be achieved. The reason is that to qualify for the OMTs, a country’s fiscal policy must be 
pre-approved by policymakers from the other member states, and this pre-approval has been almost 
certain to require that the country’s fiscal policy be non-accommodative. In practice, national fiscal 
policies appear to have remained effectively non-accommodative after the start of the OMT 
program, close to the policies that presumably would have been required to activate government 
bond purchases by the ECB under the OMTs.21 
Turning to the second fiscal intervention from the previous section, we stressed there that if 
policymakers lower the present value of primary surpluses, the price level can be expected to rise 
and output to expand in the short run if public debt is non-defaultable. This kind of fiscal 
accommodation is effectively off the table in the euro area today. If an individual government 
attempted to reduce the present value of its primary surpluses, interest rates on its debt would rise 
due to the expectations of default or debt restructuring. There would be little stimulative effect on 
the economy, if any. Thus, as in the case of the first fiscal intervention, a key problem is that debt 
issued by the fiscal authorities in the euro area is subject to the risk of default or restructuring. 
Clearly, there are no simple solutions to this problem. For instance, if all national public debt in 
the euro area were non-defaultable, member states might engage in fiscal accommodation 
excessive from the viewpoint of the monetary union as a whole.22 
See Box B for an expanded discussion of self-fulfilling creditor runs on public debt and how a central 
bank backstop such as the OMTs can stop them. 
20 See Corsetti et al. (2013, 2014) for recent business cycle models that emphasize the link between 
government bond yields and interest rates faced by private agents. 
21 Recall that the OMT program foresees purchases by the ECB of government bonds, focused on bonds with a 
maturity of between one and three years, in the secondary market. 
22 See Bergin (2000) for a formal model of how an increase in fiscal transfers to households in a single member 
state of a monetary union can, if all national public debt is non-defaultable, lead to excessive inflation 
throughout the union. 
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Box B:   Self-fulfilling creditor runs on public debt and a central bank 
backstop 
Corsetti and Dedola (2016) model how a central bank backstop such as the OMT program can 
eliminate the possibility of self-fulfilling creditor runs in the market for public debt. 
The economy consists of risk-neutral private investors, a fiscal authority, and a monetary authority. 
The fiscal authority issues debt denominated in a fiat currency and can decide ex-post to default on 
debt. The monetary authority supplies the currency as well as reserves that bear interest. The two 
authorities share the same objective: they dislike inflation, taxes, and default. The cost of inflation 
and the cost of taxes rise smoothly, whereas the cost of default has a fixed component independent 
of the size of the haircut. Both authorities optimize under discretion. 
In general, the model has multiple solutions for the interest rate that private investors demand on 
bonds issued by the fiscal authority. If investors do not expect default, they ask for a low interest 
rate. Servicing the stock of public debt is then not too burdensome, and it is optimal to use taxes to 
repay it, thus validating the investors’ expectation. If investors expect default, they demand a high 
interest rate. Debt service can in this case be so large that default becomes optimal, again validating 
the investors’ expectation. 
The monetary authority can intervene in the market in which the fiscal authority’s bonds are traded. 
The monetary authority can issue reserves and purchase a fraction of the bonds. Since maturing 
reserve deposits are convertible into currency at par in every state of the world, the interest rate on 
reserves is always weakly smaller than the interest rate on the fiscal authority’s bonds. Because of 
the interest rate differential, the overall cost of borrowing for the public sector falls if the monetary 
authority issues reserves to purchase bonds issued by the fiscal authority, making full repayment via 
taxation a more likely outcome than default and partial repayment. Thus equilibria with a self-
fulfilling run by private investors on the fiscal authority followed by default can disappear if the 
central bank announces its willingness to intervene in the bond market. 
However, in some states of the world the fundamentals might be so bad that default could occur 
independently of whether bond purchases by the monetary authority have taken place. In the case 
of default, the monetary authority suffers a capital loss and, if its balance sheet is sufficiently 
impaired, excessive inflation may result. On the one hand, the inflationary consequences of central 
bank balance sheet losses may strengthen the effectiveness of the backstop. Indeed, by engaging in 
bond purchases the central bank can reduce the fiscal authority’s incentives to default to the extent 
that the latter recognizes the social costs of high inflation. In this case, the fiscal authority will 
perceive default as less desirable after central bank bond purchases have occurred. On the other 
hand, when the fiscal authority downplays inflation costs, the central bank would be willing to 
engage in bond purchases only if the risk of inflation is not too high and if the magnitude of extra 
inflation coincident with default is not too large.23 
23 See Section 5 for more discussion of the link between the central bank’s balance sheet and inflation. 
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5   A central bank’s balance sheet may need fiscal support 
Before turning to the future of the euro area, it is worthwhile to discuss another dimension of 
monetary-fiscal interactions that has attracted attention in the wake of the recent, large expansions 
of the balance sheets of the major central banks. The most important liabilities of a modern central 
bank are fiat currency and bank reserves. Assets of a central bank can include claims on private 
agents (often banks) and on the fiscal authority or, for instance in the euro area, on multiple fiscal 
authorities. Since the market value of assets fluctuates, a central bank can suffer capital losses. 
When the quantity of reserves is small, risks to the monetary authority’s balance sheet stemming 
from this source are typically low. However, as reserves and the central bank’s assets expand 
balance-sheet risks can become sizable. 
Suppose that the market value of a central bank’s assets declines significantly. The intertemporal 
budget constraint of a central bank states that the present value of remittances from the central 
bank to its ultimate owners (in the euro area, the fiscal authorities of the member states) must equal 
the market value of the central bank’s assets minus reserves plus the present value of seigniorage. 
Therefore, following a significant decline in the value of the central bank’s assets, it is possible that 
the present value of remittances will have to become negative if the present value of seigniorage is 
to remain consistent with price stability. In other words, the monetary authority may have to be 
recapitalized (i.e., remittances to the central bank may be necessary) if it is to meet its price 
stability objective; otherwise seigniorage and inflation will have to rise.24 
In addition to the risk of the central bank losing control of the price level after a balance-sheet 
disturbance, ex-ante distortions could arise. Uncertain about fiscal support to its balance sheet, the 
central bank might avoid lending-of-last-resort interventions and balance-sheet policies for fear of 
capital losses, even if such policies were beneficial for economic activity, price stability, and financial 
stability. A harmful bias towards weak economic activity, too-low inflation, and financial fragility 
might arise. 
6   Way forward for the euro area 
The key lesson from the literature is that in the wake of a large recessionary shock accommodative 
monetary and fiscal policy together may be necessary to stabilize the economy satisfactorily. How 
can the euro area achieve an accommodative fiscal policy stance when desirable? While addressing 
this question, it is important to recognize that successful stabilization policies can be run in different 
institutional settings, and therefore there is not a unique way for the member states of the euro 
area to proceed. A strategy for the euro area to be able to implement effective stabilization policy 
24 See Del Negro and Sims (2015) and Hall and Reis (2015) for analysis of the implications of a central bank’s 
balance sheet for macroeconomic outcomes, and Corsetti and Dedola (2016) for the role of the central bank as 
a lender of last resort to the fiscal authority. 
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could rely on the following elements: a non-defaultable Eurobond that coexists with defaultable 
national public debt; fiscal criteria for the member states that allow for fiscal accommodation when 
required by economic conditions, while being consistent with fiscal discipline for each member state; 
the ability for each country to restructure national public debt, as a last resort, in an orderly way 
without prejudice to full participation in the European Union or the euro; fiscal support for the 
Eurosystem at the level of the euro area so that balance sheet considerations do not interfere with 
the ECB’s policies. 
6.1   Fiscal coordination around a non-defaultable Eurobond 
It is helpful to discuss this strategy using as an example a specific – by no means the only possible – 
institutional setup.25 A “euro area fund,” similar to the European Stability Mechanism, would be 
able to issue non-defaultable Eurobonds and would stand ready to purchase national public debt 
of each euro area member state in the primary market so long as the member state's fiscal policy 
satisfied ex-ante set criteria. As in Section 3, by “non-defaultable” we mean that the fund and the 
ECB would ensure that maturing Eurobonds would be convertible into currency at par, analogously 
to maturing reserve deposits at the ECB. The “no-default principle” would not need to apply 
irrespective of the actions of the fund and thus would not conflict with the ECB’s price stability 
objective. It would suffice if the fund and the ECB ensured that maturing Eurobonds issued as part of 
a concerted policy intervention would be convertible into currency at par. The fiscal criteria would 
stipulate that in “normal times” each national fiscal authority would be expected to provide 
automatic stabilizers and to raise its primary budget surplus in response to an increase in the 
national public debt-to-GDP ratio, sufficiently to stabilize national public debt. Importantly, the fiscal 
criteria would contain a provision for fiscal accommodation when required by economic 
conditions, e.g., after the ECB policy rates had decreased to or close to the lower bound or another 
unusual event (possibly affecting only a subset of the countries directly) had occurred. The 
necessary fiscal accommodation might be sizable, potentially falling outside the limits of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, as currently defined and implemented, and it might have to last until the 
economy has recovered. 
If the fund announced that a need for fiscal accommodation had arisen, member states would be 
expected to increase government spending, relative to the baseline without the need for fiscal 
accommodation, to be followed by an adjustment such that the present value of national primary 
surpluses remained unchanged.26 As another possibility, each member state could be expected to 
raise its primary surplus, relative to the baseline without the need for fiscal accommodation, only to 
the extent that this member state’s share in the overall stock of national public debt in the euro area 
had increased. Thus countries more affected by an adverse disturbance would raise their primary 
surpluses, while less affected countries would reduce their primary surpluses. Furthermore, the 
more affected member states would increase their primary surpluses less than in “normal times.” As 
Box C explains, the present value of primary surpluses of all member states taken together would 
25 The following idea of the “euro area fund” is inspired by Sims (2012). 
26 This is the first accommodative fiscal intervention from Section 3. 
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decline, relative to the baseline without the need for fiscal accommodation, and an accommodative 
fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole would result.27 
Since Eurobonds would be non-defaultable, their yield would be tied by arbitrage to the interest rate 
on the ECB’s deposit facility, and hence the fund would not be subject to self-fulfilling creditor runs 
of the kind that member states are currently exposed to. Furthermore, so long as a member state 
fulfilled the fiscal criteria and thus qualified for support from the fund, the yield on the member 
state’s national public debt would also be tied by arbitrage to the interest rate on the ECB’s deposit 
facility, and therefore member states in compliance with the fiscal criteria would not be subject to 
self-fulfilling creditor runs. 
If a member state found itself in violation of the fiscal criteria, the fund would be obligated not to 
purchase national public debt of that member state. The member state would then have to 
borrow exclusively from private creditors and, as a last resort, it could decide to restructure its 
national public debt. It would be desirable for national public debt restructuring to be as orderly as 
possible, with ex-ante known modalities and with all national public debt – whether held by private 
creditors or by the fund – treated symmetrically.28 Moreover, national public debt restructuring 
would be without prejudice to full participation in the European Union and the euro. In particular, 
the fund would stand ready to resume lending after restructuring as soon as the member state in 
question satisfied the fiscal criteria again. 
The fund would reduce the amount of lending available to a member state in case the member state 
was expected not to meet the fiscal criteria with some probability in the future. Similarly, the fund 
would reduce the amount of lending available to a member state in case the member state had 
recently restructured its national public debt. Private creditors would demand higher bond yields 
and restrict their lending in the wake of a restructuring or to account for the possibility of a 
restructuring in the future. Ex ante, national fiscal authorities would have an incentive to fulfill the 
fiscal criteria so as to avoid interest rate premia and credit rationing. 
The fund would be given a strictly limited ability to tax uniformly across the member states. For 
example, the fund could have the right to impose a small VAT surcharge or a modest levy on banks’ 
debt throughout the euro area. The present discounted value of a 0.5 percentage point euro-area-
wide VAT surcharge can be estimated to be equal to 1.2-1.7 trillion euros, under conservative 
assumptions. In addition, the member states could direct to the fund seigniorage from the 
Eurosystem. The present discounted value of non-inflationary seigniorage from the Eurosystem can 
be estimated to be equal to 1.6-1.7 trillion euros. 
The fund’s responsibilities could be extended to provide a backstop, when necessary, to the Single 
Resolution Mechanism, the proposed European deposit insurance scheme, and the balance sheet 
27 This is the second accommodative fiscal intervention from Section 3. Note also that the fiscal criteria could 
allow a member state to smooth out the adjustment to a “loss of competitiveness” shock, i.e., a situation in 
which firms and workers in that member state realize that they have been setting wages based on excessively 
optimistic assessments of economic growth. 
28 With symmetric treatment, a private creditor would not become more exposed to the risk of national public 
debt restructuring as the fund increased its lending. One way to achieve an orderly restructuring would be to 
make it subject to the fund’s approval and binding for all creditors given the fund’s approval. 
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of the Eurosystem. With a euro-area-level backstop in place, the Single Resolution Mechanism could 
wind down, in an orderly way, any banks that might become insolvent, e.g., due to restructuring of 
national public debt, while the common deposit insurance scheme would act to prevent bank runs in 
all member states of the euro. 
It would seem desirable for the fund to be subject to direct democratic control and to be 
independent of the individual member states. The fund would be able to tax and it would be 
making politically sensitive decisions about how to apply the fiscal criteria in particular cases (does a 
member state fulfill or violate the fiscal criteria, does a given event justify fiscal accommodation, 
what quantity of government bonds of a member state to stand ready to purchase, and so on). To 
meet the goals of democratic accountability and independence, members of the managing board of 
the fund could be elected by the European Parliament or the European Council, with a mandate to 
act in the interest of the euro area as a whole, and subject to the requirement not to hold any other 
public office. 
A key objective of the fund and of the fiscal criteria would be to allow the primary budget balance 
of a member state to respond slowly to the stock of national public debt in the wake of an adverse 
shock. It is helpful to think of the primary balance as including a component that depends on the 
business cycle and a component that reacts to the stock of debt. In the Great Recession, the 
business cycle component of the budget deteriorated throughout the euro area. As recovery began, 
the need to improve the other component arose. Between 2009 and 2014, the structural primary 
budget of Italy improved from -1.4 percent of GDP to 2.3 percent of GDP, a cumulative fiscal effort 
of 3.7 percent of GDP coincident with a decline in GDP per capita by 5 percent. In the same period, 
the structural primary budget in Spain improved from -8.5 to -0.6 percent of GDP, coincident with a 
decline in GDP per capita by 4 percent. And the structural primary budget in Portugal, to give 
another example, improved from -7.4 to 2.7 percent of GDP, coincident with a decline in GDP per 
capita by 3 percent. Had the fund and the fiscal criteria been in operation, the fiscal adjustment 
could have been more spread out over time and the GDP outcomes could have been better. 
It is possible, even likely given the experience of the OMT program in which no bonds were actually 
bought, that the fund would not have to make significant purchases of national public debt. The 
necessary size of the purchases by the fund could well be smaller than the ECB’s Expanded Asset 
Purchase Program, in which the ECB is expected to buy about 1.8 trillion euros worth of assets, 
mostly national public debt, by the end of March 2017. 
Box C:   A fiscal policy criterion for a monetary union in case of a need 
for fiscal accommodation 
This box considers an example of a reaction function for national fiscal authorities in a monetary 
union that preserves fiscal discipline for each country while, at the same, allowing for 
accommodative fiscal policy in the wake of an adverse disturbance. The example belongs to the class 
of fiscal policy reaction functions proposed by Sims (1997). Consider the following equation that 
governs the primary budget surplus of each of N countries constituting a monetary union: 
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𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛 = 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛 + 𝜓𝜓𝐵𝐵 �𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛 − 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛� 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1𝑚𝑚𝑁𝑁
𝑚𝑚=1
�+𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛,     for   𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁,        
where 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡
𝑛𝑛 is the primary surplus of country n in year t, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡−1𝑛𝑛  is the real value of national public debt 
of country n in year t-1, 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 is the output gap (the difference between output and potential output) 
of country n in year t. 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛,  𝜓𝜓𝐵𝐵, 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛, and 𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥 are parameters, all positive, and the values of 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 satisfy 
∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 = 1. This equation states that a country’s primary surplus responds to the country’s share 
in the aggregate stock of national public debt in the union (and to the country’s output gap). In 
particular, country n raises its primary surplus when the country’s share in overall debt exceeds 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛 
while reducing its primary surplus when the share falls short of 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛. By contrast, a standard fiscal 
policy reaction function relates a country’s primary surplus to the country’s own stock of national 
public debt. The above equation implies a more accommodative fiscal policy after an adverse shock 
compared with the standard fiscal policy reaction function. Suppose that an adverse disturbance 
affects some countries in the monetary union more than others. As a consequence, the debt shares 
of the more affected countries rise, while the debt shares of the less affected countries decline. In 
subsequent periods, the more affected countries increase their primary surpluses, while the less 
affected countries reduce their primary surpluses. Furthermore, since the less affected countries 
loosen their fiscal policies, the more affected countries need less fiscal effort to restore their debt 
shares to 𝜃𝜃𝑛𝑛. Fiscal discipline follows because each country’s share in the aggregate stock of national 
public debt in the union is constant in the long run and because each country is to increase its 
primary surplus after having been disproportionately affected by an adverse disturbance. 
The above equation implies that fiscal policy of the union as a whole does not respond to the 
aggregate stock of national public debt. To see this, sum the equation over n arriving at ∑ 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 =
∑ 𝜓𝜓𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1 + 𝜓𝜓𝑥𝑥 ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛𝑁𝑁𝑛𝑛=1  . This is a special case of an active fiscal policy in the sense of Leeper (1991). 
In particular, after an adverse shock the present value of the union’s primary surpluses declines, as 
in the second fiscal policy intervention from Section 3. 
Jarociński and Maćkowiak (2016) study the effects of the above fiscal policy reaction function in an 
otherwise standard, simple dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices extended to 
include government debt of two “countries” and a centrally operated fund that buys national public 
debt while issuing own non-defaultable debt. When the standard fiscal policy rule is assumed and 
the fund does not operate, the model’s outcomes are indeterminate. The indeterminacy is due to 
the presence of the lower bound (see Section 2 of this discussion paper) and the possibility of self-
fulfilling creditor runs on government debt subject to the risk of default or restructuring (see Section 
4 of this discussion paper). After a large adverse shock, the model’s predictions of the central bank 
policy rate stuck at zero, low growth and very low inflation match the euro area’s double-dip 
recession and the sovereign debt crisis. By contrast, given the above equation, the fund in operation, 
and accommodative monetary policy, the model’s outcomes are unique. Furthermore, for plausible 
parameter values, the model predicts much larger output and only somewhat higher inflation than 
in the recent euro area data. The key reason behind these improved outcomes is more 
accommodative fiscal policy which, however, does not lead to increased spreads on government 
bonds thanks to the presence of the fund. 
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6.2   A benchmark to think about other proposals for reform 
The example of an institutional setup from Section 6.1 helps to think about other proposals for 
reform of fiscal decision-making in the euro area. The ideas advanced by others tend to cluster 
around two polar cases: a strong central authority, with a broad ability to tax and spend or the 
power to veto national budgets or sanction member states (e.g., Villeroy de Galhau and Weidmann, 
2016), and “fiscal renationalization,” where each member state could adopt any freely chosen 
national fiscal policy and would bear the consequences including default, with no support from 
other member states (e.g., Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 2016). The institutional setup that we 
describe would make effective stabilization policy possible while placing the euro area somewhere 
in between the two polar cases of a deep fiscal union and fiscal renationalization.  Each member 
state would need to abandon some sovereignty in matters of fiscal policy (e.g., think of the fund’s 
strictly limited power to tax). However, at the same time, in some aspects member states could gain 
sovereignty relative to the status quo. This is because the fiscal criteria would be defined simply as 
prescriptions for the primary surplus and total government spending contingent on economic 
outcomes. More specific decisions concerning taxes, expenditures, social payments as well as 
choices regarding structural reforms could be left to individual member states. A quid pro quo in 
which each member state loses some sovereignty in selected areas while gaining it in others might 
be acceptable to European citizens. 
A deep fiscal union is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for effective stabilization policy. 
A deep fiscal union with rules preventing accommodative fiscal policy would not help smooth out 
the business cycles. Likewise, national fiscal policies forced to tighten in a downturn in order to 
avoid creditor runs, default, and exit from the euro – a pattern that would be likely to arise under 
fiscal renationalization – would not help attenuate the business cycles. 
Table 1 summarizes selected other recent proposals for reform featuring Eurobonds or a euro area 
entity that would purchase national public debt. Often, the proposals focus on “legacy debt,” 
starting from the observation that national public debt levels in many euro area countries must be 
reduced discretely. The fiscal criteria outlined here could envisage a slow reduction of national 
public debt levels over time until a steady state is reached. With the fund ready to issue non-
defaultable bonds to purchase national public debt, there would be no need for an upfront, sharp 
decrease in the stocks of that debt. 
6.3   An option for the near future 
Since a euro area institution able to issue non-defaultable debt already exists, the ECB, one could 
argue that the simplest solution would be for the ECB to act as the fund described here. Indeed, a 
policy mix consisting of the ECB keeping its interest rates low and expanding the monetary base in 
order to purchase national public debt – as implemented in the Public Sector Purchase Program – 
together with fiscal accommodation by the member states would have had sizable effects on the 
economy and remains a sensible short-term option. That being said, in the medium and long run 
the institutional structure including the fund, described here, appears preferable. The ECB does not 
have the ability to tax and therefore it cannot provide fiscal support for the balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem. Moreover, it seems desirable for an institution making decisions concerning fiscal policy 
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– like the fund described here – to be subject to more direct democratic control than that applied to 
a central bank. 
7   Additional considerations 
The argument for non-defaultable Eurobonds in this paper focuses on their role in business cycle 
stabilization policy. The economic literature also notes the favorable effects of a “safe asset” for 
financial stability and thus for saving, investment, and long-run growth.29 To reap these benefits to a 
significant degree, the market for Eurobonds would have to be very liquid, or, in other words, the 
fund described here would have to purchase large quantities of national public debt more or less 
continuously. It seems preferable for the fund, at least initially, to intervene only when a need for 
euro-area-wide fiscal accommodation has arisen and possibly without making large purchases. The 
more sizable the fund’s portfolio, the higher the fund’s exposure to losses in case of national public 
debt restructuring, and therefore the more significant the tax backing that the fund would need. 
The standard models of monetary policy that we have drawn on focus on the transmission 
mechanism from the central bank’s policy rates to the interest rates faced by firms and households, 
and thence to investment and consumption decisions. By contrast, other models have emphasized 
that monetary policy affects directly firms’ cash-flow and households’ wages and disposable income, 
in an environment where borrowing constraints are pervasive.30 The accommodative fiscal 
interventions considered in this paper, an increase in government spending and a rise in transfers, 
affect directly firms’ cash-flow and households’ disposable income, respectively, and therefore 
would have a sizable impact also if borrowing constraints are pervasive. 
In addition, the standard models we have focused on abstract from issues such as hysteresis effects 
and secular stagnation that have received attention elsewhere in the literature, including recently.31 
To the extent that hysteresis effects or secular stagnation are present, the case for resolute 
monetary and fiscal accommodation in the wake of a sizable adverse shock becomes even stronger. 
8   Conclusions  
In the wake of a large recessionary disturbance accommodative monetary and fiscal policy together 
may be necessary to stabilize economic activity and inflation. In the euro area, achieving and 
maintaining an accommodative fiscal stance has proved difficult. We described a benchmark 
institutional setup that would make it possible for the euro area to implement effective stabilization 
policy. We also suggested an option for the short run that consists of the monetary accommodation 
already being implemented together with fiscal accommodation by the member states.  
29 See, for instance, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). 
30 See, e.g., Den Haan et al. (2015), Gornemann et al. (2012), Kaplan et al. (2015), and McKay et al. (2015). 
31 The classic treatment of hysteresis effects is in Blanchard and Summers (1986). Blanchard et al. (2015) 
provide a more recent, empirical analysis. Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) and Eggertsson et al. (2015) study 
models of secular stagnation. 
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Table 1:   The proposal in this paper compared with other proposals featuring Eurobonds or a euro area entity that would purchase national public debt 
 The euro area fund in this 
paper 
The European debt agency, 
Brunnermeier et al. (2011) 
The Blue Bond agency, 
Delpha and von 
Weizsäcker (2010) 
The European redemption 
fund, German Council of 
Economic Experts (2011) 
The stability fund, Corsetti 
et al. (2015) 
The Eurozone agency, Paris 
and Wyplosz (2014) 
Objective of the institution Enable a fiscal policy 
regime that allows 
stabilization of 
macroeconomic 
fluctuations 
Create a safe asset Discourage borrowing in 
excess of 60% of GDP (red 
bonds), make borrowing up 
to 60% of GDP cheaper 
(blue bonds) 
One-time reduction of 
debt: bring government 
debt down below 60% of 
GDP 
One-time reduction of 
debt: bring government 
debt down below 95% in all 
euro area member states 
One-time reduction of debt 
overhang: halve debt-to-
GDP ratios in the euro area 
member states 
Purchases of government 
bonds by the institution 
Buys government bonds of 
euro area member states 
as long as their fiscal policy 
satisfies ex-ante set criteria 
Buys government bonds up 
to 60% of each member 
state's GDP 
No No. The fund accumulates 
claims on the governments 
by covering their funding 
needs in the roll-in-phase 
(around 5 years) of the 
redemption fund 
Buys government bonds of 
the euro area member 
states in excess of 95% of 
each member state's GDP 
and immediately retires 
them* 
Buys half of government 
bonds of the euro area 
member states and 
immediately retires them* 
Assets of the institution Government bonds of euro 
area member states (in 
case of default, all holders 
of government bonds, 
including the euro area 
fund, are treated equally), 
limited ability to tax 
uniformly across member 
states 
Government bonds of euro 
area member states (in 
case of default, all holders 
of government bonds, 
including the European 
Debt Agency, are treated 
equally) 
Rights to earmarked tax 
revenues transferred 
directly into the blue bond 
agency 
Rights to earmarked mark-
up on national tax 
revenues directly 
transferred to the fund plus 
a part of the foreign 
currency reserves 
Rights to earmarked 
revenues during 50 years 
from wealth transfer tax, 
VAT surcharge and 
seigniorage 
Rights to seigniorage, 
forever 
Liabilities of the institution Eurobond, non-defaultable 
similar to ECB reserves 
Senior tranche (European 
Safe Bonds, or ESBies), and 
a junior tranche 
Blue bonds, guaranteed 
jointly by the treasuries of 
the participating member 
states 
Safe bonds, guaranteed 
jointly by the treasuries of 
the participating member 
states 
Stability fund bills, 
collateralized by the 
earmarked 50 years of 
revenues and insured 
against liquidity shocks by 
the ECB 
Agency's bonds 
Time horizon indefinite indefinite indefinite 20-25 years, in this period 
all government debt above 
60% of GDP is repaid 
50 years. By that time 
stability fund bills are paid 
back. (The proposal 
includes also creation of 
another, permanent safe 
asset as a senior tranche of 
a pool of government 
bonds.) 
indefinite 
* “Retires” means “converts into non-interest bearing perpetuities.” 
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